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The dangers and limitations of equality
agendas as means for tackling old-age
prejudice
COLIN DUNCAN*
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a critique of both the concept of age equality and of the
limited scope it oﬀers as a means for challenging old-age prejudice. The equality
constructs that feature in anti-ageism initiatives and in current discourses on
intergenerational equity have proved susceptible to political and ideological
manipulation, which has led to the illegitimate dissociation of ageism from older
age and promoted damaging notions of age equivalence. The consequence has
been that old-age prejudice has been de-prioritised, and older people have been
de-legitimised socially and as a welfare constituency. The corrective is best sought
outside the conﬁnes of age equality frameworks, although legal remedies may
play a useful role if human dignity is incorporated as an equality criterion. This
paper also assesses other approaches to tackling old-age prejudice that avoid the
constraints of equality constructs and engage more ﬁrmly with its roots. The
notion of the ‘ third age’ with new social roles merits reconsideration as an
aﬀordable alternative to current policies of work obligation and pension re-
trenchment. Radical interventions in the labour market in favour of older people
may also be needed. Age activism and advocacy will increasingly inﬂuence policy
on prejudice and well-being in older age, but changed emphases are needed, as
from defensive strategies and the ideologies of generational interdependence and
solidarity, towards the promotion of organisational, ﬁnancial and social auton-
omy in older age.
KEY WORDS – ageism, agelessness, equality, intergenerational solidarity, old
age, third age, fourth age.
Introduction
The European Union (EU) framework Equal Treatment Directive has recently
led to the introduction of anti-age discrimination laws across the mem-
ber states (Council Directive 2000/78/EC). This development has co-
incided with concerns over the aﬀordability of older people and of
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intergenerational equity in the light of demographic ageing. The concept
of ‘age equality ’ has therefore acquired some prominence both as a public
policy objective and in the agendas of advocacy groups. The main argu-
ment of this paper is that age equality, both as a theoretical construct and
in policy application, is highly problematic, especially for confronting the
age discrimination that aﬀects older people, who are widely regarded as
most prone to this form of prejudice. Accordingly, the current thinking
and policies that embrace age-equality constructs may be contributing to,
rather than confronting, the marginalisation of older people.
The discussion has four main sections. The ﬁrst describes how the
version of anti-ageism that has been incorporated into United Kingdom
and European law and into recent voluntary initiatives is a departure from
its original association with older age, and how this has adversely aﬀected
the legal scope for challenging old-age prejudice. The concepts and con-
structs embraced in current age equality and anti-ageism thinking in em-
ployment and other areas are next considered. It will be argued that they
are defective in several respects, not least as a means for advancing well-
being in older age, and instead de-legitimise older people socially and as
a welfare constituency. An assessment follows of the more direct threat to
older people posed by current discourses on the aﬀordability of older
people and generational equity.
The second section argues from various perspectives that age prejudice
against older people is best regarded as an analytically or ontologically
distinct phenomenon that diﬀers signiﬁcantly in origin, scale and dimen-
sions from that which aﬀects younger adults. As such, it can never be
challenged adequately by its crude subsumption as one of many age
equality issues. On this basis, the paper’s third section explores other
avenues of challenging old-age prejudice that will both avoid the dangers
and limitations of current equality constructs and engage more ﬁrmly with
the roots of the prejudice, including the important role that older people
might play through ‘age activism’. The concluding section synthesises
the key features of the analysis and oﬀers some broad pointers as to ap-
propriate policy priorities. The discussion focuses chieﬂy but not exclus-
ively upon the experience of the United Kingdom (UK).
Age equality and the marginalisation of older people
The UK legislation of October 2006 to combat age discrimination in
employment and vocational training has several implications for older
people and all retirees. Forced retirement is now outlawed prior to a
‘default retirement age’ of 65 years, and employees have a right to request
1134 Colin Duncan
that they continue to be employed beyond this age. Moreover, the UK
government plans to review the default age in 2011, with a view to
an outright ban on compulsory retirement (Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) 2005: 61). By extending working lives and thereby
prolonging earned income and increasing pension contributions, and by
challenging outmoded age stereotypes, such measures might be thought to
advance ﬁnancial and social wellbeing in older age. The legislation also
outlaws age discrimination in recruitment, promotion and harassment, as
well as unfair dismissal and other workplace practices in which older
workers are said to be especially disadvantaged. Moreover, the govern-
ment has not ruled out extending the legislation to the provision of goods,
facilities and services (DTI 2005: 18). Nonetheless, the new law does not
speciﬁcally protect older people, because the anti-ageism that it embraces
has departed from its original association with old age.
The evolution of the ageism concept
Three phases in the evolution of the ageism concept are apparent. The
ﬁrst formulations in both Britain and the United States (US) were coined
chieﬂy with respect to retirees and others of advanced age. Indeed,
coinage of the term ‘ageism’ is usually attributed to Robert Butler, an
American geriatrician, who in 1969 applied it to the prejudice by middle-
class white residents against proposals for housing projects for elderly
black people. His oft-quoted deﬁnition applied exclusively to older people,
and speciﬁed ageism as: ‘a process of systematic stereotyping of and dis-
crimination against people because they are old, just as racism and sexism
accomplish this for skin color and gender’ (Butler 1995: 22–3). In the
United Kingdom, ageism was recognised somewhat later as a form of
prejudice, but the initial ascriptions had the same focus. A volume pub-
lished by Age Concern England in 1990 was among the ﬁrst to challenge
this ‘unrecognised discrimination’ ; the exposition was wholly conﬁned to
the discriminatory treatment of older people in health care, social and vol-
untary services, retailing, consumer services and employment (McEwen
1990).
A second phase in the British usage of ageism came during the 1990s,
when it came to be associated mostly with the treatment of older employees
(especially men). This was a new label for a far from new policy focus. Age
discrimination against older workers has been a long-standing if incon-
sistently asserted policy concern in the UK and elsewhere. Indeed,
Macnicol (2003: 14) noted examples of US state laws to protect older
workers more than a century ago. The renewed assertion in the UK
during the 1990s reﬂected concerns about the future aﬀordability of
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pensions and welfare, given the joint eﬀects of rapidly declining employ-
ment participation among older men and the ageing of the population.
This ‘hijacking’ of the concept for welfare funding and labour-market
management objectives deﬂected attention from the broader phenom-
enon. Inﬂuential ‘ structured dependency’ perspectives in sociology re-
inforced this process, by treating poverty, social exclusion and other
possible manifestations of prejudice in older age chieﬂy as by-products
of employment discrimination, which forced older people out of work and
into dependency (Phillipson 1982; Townsend 1981; Walker 1980, 1990). As
exempliﬁcation, for Walker (1990: 61) compulsory retirement constituted
‘ the wellspring’ of age discrimination.
A third phase in ageism’s usage in the UK was evident from the late
1990s, when its reference extended to employees of any age, a version
embraced in a voluntary Age Code of Practice issued by the government
(Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) 1999), and that was
later endorsed in an EU Directive that provided the template for the UK
legislation. US age-employment legislation is diﬀerent, in that it applies
only to employees aged 40 or more years. Among factors inﬂuencing this
development was growing evidence that age prejudice also aﬀected
younger people and even ‘prime age’ employees – those regarded as
neither too old nor too young to have peak physical or intellectual vigour
(Age Concern England 1998; DfEE 2001; Loretto, Duncan and White
2000). Age had also become incorporated into equal opportunities agendas
by the late 1990s (Cully et al. 1998: 13). Moreover, the logic of equal
opportunities discouraged an exclusive reference to older employees in
British and European law.
Age legislation and older people
The UK legislation not only marks the end of earlier associations of ageism
with older age, but speciﬁcally excludes older people outside employment
and vocational training, on the contestable ground that ‘ageism in the
workplace is widely regarded as the most signiﬁcant and damaging aspect
of age discrimination’ (Age Positive 2006). Irrespective of future intentions,
the symbolic priority accorded to younger employed people over those be-
yond state retirement age seems unmistakable. It might be argued, never-
theless, that the uniform application of age legislation to all employees
need not lessen relative beneﬁts for older workers ; if older employees are
disproportionately aﬀected by age discrimination then they should beneﬁt
to a greater degree. The empirical evidence tends to suggest a bi-polar
incidence of age discrimination in employment, with older and younger
workers most aﬀected and the middle-aged less so (Duncan and Loretto
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2004; Snape and Redman 2003), but two features of the law may prevent
this pattern being translated into a beneﬁcial impact for older people.
First, ‘objective justiﬁcation’ for discriminatory treatment, as provided
for in UK law and age legislation elsewhere, can more easily be demon-
strated in the case of older workers. Indeed, commercial justiﬁcations for
discriminating against older workers are more numerous than are often
recognised (Duncan 2001). These include: the tendency, however exag-
gerated, for performance to decline and ‘burn-out ’ to increase with age;
for older workers to have depreciated or obsolete skills ; that many older
workers’ higher salaries and other beneﬁts of long service may not be
matched by higher productivity ; older workers’ lower job mobility ; and
succession planning issues. Moreover, some investigations have found
that ‘pure ’ discrimination, embracing mistaken beliefs or simple preju-
dice, is relatively rare and not the major cause of labour-market exclusion
(Campbell 1999; Mckay and Middleton 1998). Certainly, the US Age
Discrimination in Employment Act 1967, that applies exclusively to older
workers, has not prevented a sharp fall in economic-activity rates among
older men as have occurred in most developed economies (Macnicol
2006: 82). Age laws tempered by commercial criteria may therefore do less
than anticipated to protect older employees.
It need hardly be said that ‘rational ’ or ‘objective’ discrimination is as
damaging to the aﬀected employees as that based upon simple prejudice,
although in contrast to the mandates of disability discrimination legis-
lation, there is no requirement to accommodate older workers through
‘reasonable adjustments ’. Moreover, even if the law to some extent inhibits
employers’ interpretation of ‘ rational ’ discrimination, as by restrictions on
compulsory retirement (a measure which many employers ﬁercely resisted
on business grounds), the alternative of being ejected from the workplace
following a humiliating performance appraisal is hardly an advance.
Indeed, some employers’ associations have warned that their members
might resort to ‘convoluted’ appraisal methods to dismiss older employees,
who would otherwise have celebrated their retirement or have accepted
generous early-retirement deals. Individual appraisal is likely to increase if
the default retirement age is abolished (DTI 2003: 10).
Secondly, the concept of age-neutrality, as implicit in the application
of the law to all ages, will motivate employers to examine critically the
rationality of all age-related employment practices, including any that
hitherto favoured older workers. To do otherwise could enhance an em-
ployer’s vulnerability to discrimination claims from younger employees.
Indeed, the UK legislation speciﬁcally restricts service-related beneﬁts to
ﬁve years or less, unless a longer period can be objectively justiﬁed, a
change unfavourable to long-service employees. There are also fears that
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the legislation will reduce redundancy beneﬁts for older workers, and that
to achieve age parity they will be levelled down not up.
Anti-ageism concepts and constructs
Embraced in anti-ageism thinking are several concepts and constructs that
inﬂuence how old age is perceived and treated. Of particular signiﬁcance
is the notion of ‘agelessness ’, which has at least two forms. One is
the concept of age neutrality, which asserts that age has little relevance in
decision-making so that, for instance, application forms should no longer
require candidates for employment to specify their ages. The other focuses
on older people and holds that the active adulthood stage of life extends (or
should extend) beyond the customary working ages. During the 1990s,
champions of older workers embraced this thinking in seeking to combat
age discrimination and early exit from employment, and were particularly
active in debunking negative age stereotypes, in particular that personal
capability or productivity signiﬁcantly decline with older age (Taylor
and Walker 1993, 1995; Tillsley 1990; Trinder, Hulme and McCarthy
1992). Such thinking is now also widely endorsed outside employment,
as with the preoccupation with ‘positive’ or ‘active’ ageing in medicine
and gerontology. Commercial interests too have exploited and reinforced
ageless or age-blind sentiments, including, most directly, the providers of
cosmetics and cosmetic-surgery, which proﬁt from the fashionable em-
phasis upon keeping old age at bay. The ‘retirement industry’ and general
consumer marketing trends increasingly target older people through
images of positive ageing and an active lifestyle in old age (Featherstone
and Hepworth 1995; Sawchuck 1995).
Notions of agelessness have extended in some accounts to challenging
‘old age’ itself as a legitimate construct, with terms such as ‘old’ or ‘ the
elderly ’ being deemed essentially meaningless and ageist and serving only
to fuel age prejudice (Bytheway 1995: chapter 9). The agelessness con-
struct, however, is a double-edged sword. Not only can age-neutrality
dilute and downgrade special protection for older people, the positive
ageing version can embrace anti-ageing as well as anti-ageist sentiments,
and thereby on occasion promote and perpetuate old-age discrimination
(Andrews 1999, 2000; Gibson 2000). Negative connotations of old age are
reinforced as something to be avoided, and at a personal level older people
are required to deny who they are, which is ‘ultimately disempowering’,
while the dignity of the self is replaced by self-loathing as signs of bodily
age encroach, thereby leading to a ‘socially induced schizophrenia’
(Andrews 1999: 307–8). The marketing strategies of American ‘active
adult ’ retirement communities, as described by McHugh (2003), illustrate
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the superﬁciality and self-deception that agelessness can embrace. The
strategies focus on healthy, upper middle-class retirees, who are also
family-oriented so that adult children will care for them outside the com-
munities when they get too old and sick and return home to die. Staﬀ
guides are also instructed to avoid cemeteries in tours of facilities. Self-
deception among ‘the ageless ’ is thereby maintained by their spatial seg-
regation from both the young and ‘not ageless ’ old: ‘a most alluring mask,
the ageless self-located in idyllic settings outside time and change’
(2003:169).
The agelessness construct has also played an important ideological role
in supporting welfare and labour-market reforms. This is a prominent
theme in the work of Macnicol (2003, 2006). He has argued that UK
government policy on age discrimination has been subsumed in broader
macroeconomic objectives. The ascendancy of supply-side competitive
strategies for increasing the labour supply, lowering wages and boosting
proﬁts, has led to workfare-type measures for dormant labour categories,
including older people, and a pro-active welfare model that emphasises
work obligation and investment in human capital over economic main-
tenance. The Welfare to Work Programme with the New Deal 50-plus pro-
gramme for older workers is a case in point, as is the advocacy to raise
state pension and public-sector occupational pension ages. In this context,
the ideology of agelessness confers legitimacy upon unpopular reforms:
‘ the controversial ideal of an ‘‘ageless ’’ society has as its obverse the
implication that the protective walls that have hitherto shielded older
people … should be torn down’ (Macnicol 2003: 32). As has been pointed
out, however, UK age legislation may do little to protect older employees
from being discarded involuntarily from employment on productivity
or capability criteria, and in combination with new welfare models,
older people could therefore become ‘victims of a diﬀerent and equally
ruthless kind of discrimination’ (Macnicol 2006: 47). Moreover, some
argue from historical evidence that the spread of men’s early exit from
employment is a long-run and possibly irreversible phenomenon, brought
about mainly by the demise of formerly dominant employment sectors
such as mining and heavy industry (Beatty and Fothergill 2004; Macnicol
2006: 84–5). From this perspective, the eﬃcacy of supply-side initiatives is
questionable, unless the intention is forcibly to enlist displaced or retired
men into expanding service occupations at the bottom of the labour
market, which for Macnicol (2006: 266) would constitute ‘ the ultimate
form of ageism’.
Indeed, the protection of the concept of retirement as an adequately-
ﬁnanced ‘reward for work’ and a hard-won labour right seldom features
in the agendas of anti-ageism activists who, from both active ageing and
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structured dependency perspectives, have focused upon forced retirement
and job exclusion as the chief manifestations of old-age prejudice. Yet the
vehement opposition by employees and trades unions in Britain, France
and Germany to recent proposals to raise public-sector and state pension
ages, mounted under ‘work-till-you-drop’ slogans, bears testimony to the
importance that employees attach to retirement rights. In the UK, these
are perceived as threatened rather than protected by age equality reforms.
One rough attempt to quantify the erosion of retirement beneﬁts since
the introduction of the United States age legislation estimated that older
Americans had experienced a 30 per cent decline in pension income be-
tween 1970 and 2003, and reasoned that because life expectancy increased
over the same period by only 16 per cent, older Americans had on average
lost 14 per cent of ‘old age leisure’, and so had to work longer
(Ghilarducci 2004: 6).
Aﬀordability and intergenerational equity
Running parallel with the elaboration of anti-ageism policies has been a
quite separate discourse on age equality, which by questioning older
people’s future ‘aﬀordability ’ and their share of public resources relative
to younger age groups, directly challenges their wellbeing. Concerns over
the solvency of pension schemes for the 1960s baby-boom generation have
revived such thinking in the UK, as exempliﬁed by Bosanquet and Gibbs’s
(2005) call for the reallocation of resources to the ‘IPOD generation’.
While the themes of non-aﬀordability and generational inequity are often
presented as related consequences of demographic trends, they are actu-
ally discrete issues. The former is more easily challenged, not least by
reference to historical precedents. Concerns about the growing burden of
‘ the elderly ’ were prominent in the UK during the 1930s, and again in the
late 1940s and early 1950s (Macnicol 2006: 152), yet no social security crisis
subsequently ensued. For Mullan (2002) and his associates (Tomorrow’s
Company 2005), the ‘myth’ of a ticking demographic time bomb derives
mostly from inadequate measures of dependency, which usually rely upon
the crudely fashioned ‘old-age support ratio ’ – those aged 65 or more
years relative to the number in working age (16 or 18 to 64 years). A more
accurate measure is the ‘ total economic support ratio ’, which compares
those in work against those who are not, including children. This was 0.48
in 2003 and is projected to decline to only 0.45 by 2041, almost the same as
in 1961. Moreover, if productivity grows at 1.75 per cent a year (lower than
recent trends), workers will produce twice as much in 2045 as now, making
any plausible changes in total economic dependency manageable
(Tomorrow’s Company 2005: 6).
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Intergenerational inequity is more diﬃcult to substantiate or refute. It is
a highly complex syndrome and prone to facile understandings, especially
if comparisons at one point in time are made. More relevant, according to
some commentators, is the achievement of ‘processional justice ’, that is
justice over time between age groups and generations (Laslett 1996: 233;
Laslett and Fishkin 1992). Diﬀerent age groups have diﬀerent needs, and
unequal treatment need not violate justice if each cohort beneﬁts equally
over a lifetime. In this respect, age inequality diﬀers fundamentally from
gender, race and other forms of discrimination, but this has been
inadequately recognised in British law, which instead has extended a
pre-existing, time-static, discrimination framework to age equity.
There is also the issue of whether present allocations are appropriate to
diﬀerent age needs. If too much is spent on the old relative to the young, or
vice versa, a form of injustice might be said to exist even if everyone
experiences that injustice equally as they pass through life. There have
been attempts to apply John Rawls’s precepts in determining the just age
allocation of health resources in this second sense (Daniels 1988; Wolf
1999). These rely upon the notion that principles of justice are best derived
from behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ (Rawls 1972: 17–22), an abstraction that
assumes that just principles can only be determined by prudential agents
who are blinded to all facts about themselves that will cloud their impar-
tiality, including their ages. Ironically, however, any reallocations so de-
rived would frustrate processional justice. Processional injustice occurs
if one age cohort or ‘generation’ beneﬁts from welfare transfers or tax
changes at various life stages as it proceeds through the lifecourse, a form
of inequity that Thomson (1989) claimed to have detected in New
Zealand. Cohorts of diﬀerent sizes can also give rise to processional in-
justice. A small cohort that follows a large cohort – such as the 1960s baby
boomers – can carry a heavier burden if their beneﬁts are cut or taxes
raised to deal with aﬀordability issues. It might also be argued, however,
that the (inevitably?) higher living standards of future cohorts, and indeed
many other factors experienced diﬀerentially by diﬀerent cohorts, such as
wars or economic depressions, should also be taken into account.
Moreover, interdependencies between cohorts or generations question
the eﬃcacy of age-equity policies. For instance, if pensions are cut, em-
ployees may have to provide for their elderly parents, while raising un-
employment beneﬁts may beneﬁt retirees in reducing their children’s
reliance upon them. Private transfers within the family are usually down-
ward, from older to younger members, but are generally ignored in dis-
cussions of generational equity (Rydell 2005: 28). Finally, the concept of
intergenerational equity is problematic on account of the heterogeneity
of older people. Indeed intra-generational inequality by class and gender
The limitations of age-equality agenda 1141
may be more marked than that between generations, and attempts to
achieve age equity could well exacerbate such inequalities. For instance,
the poor tend to die younger and to receive low aggregate pension income.
Similarly, Ginn and Arber (2000) argued that, given gender inequalities in
pension provision and the greater role of women in providing informal
health care, the consequences of mooted pension and health-service
changes to address generational inequity would have a greater negative
impact upon women, who constitute the majority of older people.
Needless to say, such complexities seldom surface in sensationalist ‘age
war’ treatments, and a common view is that the main inﬂuence on the
discourse has been ideological and its chief role has been to facilitate
welfare retrenchment (Kohli 2005: 519; Macnicol 2006: 51, 56; Minkler
and Robertson 1991). Emerging in the United States during the mid-1980s,
the notion of intergenerational inequity was largely promoted by
Republicans and business interests. Particularly inﬂuential was the for-
mation in 1984 of Americans for Generational Equity (AGE), a lobby group
chaired by a Republican senator and ﬁnanced by private health-care and
insurance corporations. The terminology that has characterised both the
aﬀordability and equity discourses has been most unedifying, in that it
has fed upon and exacerbated old-age prejudice. This has been apparent
not only with respect to lobby organisations such as AGE, with their loose
talk of ‘greedy geezers ’ and ‘whingeing pensioners ’ (Laslett 1996: 238),
but also in political and academic circles. For instance, the Swedish
Minister of Finance recently referred to the baby-boom generation as a
‘mountain of ﬂesh’ (Rydell 2005: 4), while Kotlikoﬀ and Burns (2004),
prominent US promoters of intergenerational equity, have characterised
the current situation as constituting ‘ﬁscal child abuse ’. This thinking
complements that of agelessness in de-legitimising older people as a wel-
fare constituency.
The nature and distinctiveness of old-age prejudice
Given that anti-ageism movements originated in concerns that older
people were more rather than less prone to discrimination, it is ironic and
perverse that age-equality agendas in eﬀect de-prioritise old-age prejudice
and threaten wellbeing in older age. The priorities of governments in
shaping age agendas are partly the reason, but there are also grounds for
arguing that old-age prejudice is an analytically distinct phenomenon that
has been inadequately recognised and addressed by its subsumption as an
age equality issue. At least four features of the age prejudice that aﬀects
older people might be considered particular to the age group. First, it
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derives in large part from human fear of the ageing process and its
association with decline, dependency and mortality. People therefore seek
to distance themselves from the labels ‘elderly ’ or ‘old ’ and the associated
negative stereotypes, and older people especially therefore become derided
andmarginalised. Secondly, old-age prejudice seems muchmore pervasive
in its reach than the prejudices that aﬀect younger people. Under-
representation or exclusion from employment, the media, advertising and
jury service are examples, along with ageist assumptions underlying many
aspects of health care, social services and education provision. Drawing
upon structured dependency perspectives, Scrutton (1990: 21) dubbed
these wider manifestations as ‘ structural ageism’, when ageist attitudes
‘become part of the rules of institutions, govern the conduct of social life
and blend imperceptibly into everyday values and attitudes that … have a
drastic eﬀect on the way older people lead their lives ’.
Thirdly, old-age prejudice can assume a greater intensity and perni-
ciousness than that aﬀecting younger people, extending on occasions to
denial of ‘personhood’ and treatment as a sub-human species. This is
reﬂected, for instance, in the ‘ fair-innings ’ argument, that older people
have a lesser claim to rationed health care and other resources and, in
an extreme expression, that their deaths should be less mourned. The
implication is that beyond a certain age threshold, rights to life become
diminished. Related thinking underlies the use of QALYs (Quality
Adjusted Life Years) and related methods of prioritising health resources,
which embrace utilitarian assumptions that legitimise comparisons of the
relative worth of diﬀerent lives, and which in practice tend to devalue the
years lived by older people. The retention of the ‘epidemiology of ageing’
as a medical expression is also symptomatic of the denial of personhood
with the implication that old age is akin to a disease. Another manifestation
is the tendency towards ‘ infantilisation’ in the institutional treatment of
dependent older people. In explaining this phenomenon, Hockey and
James (1995) argued that the social construction of childhood in Western
societies constitutes a denial of personhood with respect to children too,
if more benevolent in intent. The assumptions of immaturity and depen-
dency in childhood provides a comforting template for adult carers ;
imaging old age as a second childhood bridges the cognitive dissonance
between the physical dependency of some older people and independent
adulthood. Treating older people as child-like extends beyond institutional
settings to become a pervasive patronising concern that challenges older
people’s competence and freedom, and undermines their independence
and morale (Scrutton 1990: 12).
For Thomas Cole (1992), all such features are but symptoms of a more
fundamental malaise aﬄicting old age, a crisis of ‘meaning’ at the end of
The limitations of age-equality agenda 1143
life. In his inﬂuential cultural history of ageing in America, Cole traced the
transformation of Western ideas about old age between the 16th century
and the third quarter of the 20th century. Ancient and medieval under-
standings of old age as part of the eternal order of things gave way to the
secular, scientiﬁc and individualistic tendencies of modernity. Old age
was gradually removed from its religious and cultural signiﬁcance as a
meaningful end-stage in the ‘ journey of life ’, and redeﬁned as a scientiﬁc
and medical problem. By the mid-20th century, older people were con-
ﬁned to society’s margins, culturally disenfranchised, and robbed of vital
social roles and sense of purpose. This resulted not only in the negative
and degenerative aspects of old age being emphasised and exaggerated,
but also in the emergence from the early 19th century of a counter-
point – conceptions of a ‘good old age’ of health, virtue and self-reliance.
The latter exacerbated rather than addressed the loss of meaning, how-
ever, by promoting the denial and postponement of old age, thereby
perpetuating its ontological barrenness.
The resonance of Cole’s work in foreshadowing subsequent critiques of
the idea of agelessness is noteworthy. Indeed, under Cole’s formulation
of the nature of old-age prejudice, which might usefully be labelled ‘onto-
logical ageism’, both age discrimination and its ‘positive ageing’ policy
antidotes denigrate older age because they endorse the same prognosis of
the end-stage of life as bereft of purpose and status : ‘The attack on ageism
originated in the same chorus of cultural values that gave rise to ageism in
the ﬁrst place – ageism and its critics have much more in common than
is generally realized’ (1992: 228). This analysis clearly challenges the
legitimacy of current anti-ageism and equality constructs with respect to
older age, and supports the view that anti-ageism agendas are currently
in something of a crisis. As McHugh (2003: 181) commented with some
exasperation, ‘negative images of elders are ageist, so-called positive images
of elders are ageist. Bipolar and equivocal views of ageing dominate our
age, and regress in an inﬁnite series that leads inexorably to the most
perplexing question of all : is non-ageist thinking fathomable or culturally
possible? ’
Ageism and younger people
While there is evidence that ageism is experienced with comparable
frequency by both older and younger employees, such ﬁndings need to be
treated with considerable caution, and there is still a case for seeing old-
age prejudice as special. The supply-side and human capital factors that
diﬀerentiate the employment conditions and prospects of diﬀerent age
groups may be wrongly perceived as irrational age prejudice, as might a
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host of other factors such as poor career advancement on account of
performance rather than age. There is evidence, moreover, that older
people have a greater tendency to internalise negative age stereotypes and
hence are less likely to report or perceive age injustice (Duncan and
Loretto 2004). While negative age stereotyping is reportedly experienced
across the entire age range, surveys seldom capture diﬀerences in the
degrees of prejudice or injury visited upon diﬀerent age groups. Bearing
these caveats in mind, it is plausible that young and older people can
genuinely be exposed to age prejudice of a similar nature and degree. If
denial of personhood is accepted as a feature of both old age and child-
hood, then vestiges are likely to extend both upwards, into young adult-
hood and young-adult workers, and downwards to older workers and the
‘young-old’ in general. For younger adults, however, the problem is
temporary, unrelated to fears of ageing processes, and will ease with
age, while for older adults the opposite can be expected, with prejudice
intensifying into deep old age.
Another explanation for the detection of ageism across all ages, in-
cluding among ‘prime age’ employees, might simply be that appropriate
age diﬀerentiation has been observed. Current formulations of ageism
come close to associating any form of age diﬀerentiation with prima
facie evidence of prejudice and injustice, but the use of ‘age appropriate ’
distinctions can be defended. Few could deny that needs and contributions
diﬀer by age. The social-care and health-care needs of older people
mean that they generally consume a disproportionate portion of such
provision and of other social expenditure; and children are deemed
unsuited to marry or contribute economically until a certain age is
reached, distinctions recognised in law and resource allocations.
Moreover, for Neugarten (1981), age-status systems and norms pervade
the cultural fabric of any society and secure a high degree of consensus,
whether formally sustained in rules and regulations or applied by social
sanction. Examples of the latter include social disapproval of those above
a certain age frequenting clubs or other social settings geared to youth; or
popular disapproval of wide age gaps in emotional or sexual relationships.
Furthermore, an age-status system may be viewed as functional in providing
an essential mechanism of social control in any society :
For the individual, it establishes a series of social positions that provide clarity and
predictability, regular movement from lower to higher rungs of the age-status
ladder, and a certain coherence as new role patterns are automatically assigned
with increasing age. For the society, it provides for an eﬀective division of labor,
in the broadest sense of that term, thereby establishing a social mechanism for
maintaining the economy, the educational system, the family system, and the
military, political and religious systems (Neugarten 1981: 815).
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Recognition of age norms or ‘appropriateness ’ as a major dimension of
social organisation similarly led Macnicol (2002: 16) to conclude that ‘as
age is a category we all deploy in order to make sense of the world – a truly
‘‘age-neutral ’’ society can only ever be a hypothetical abstraction’.
It is plausible, therefore, that the realisation that age discrimination
aﬀects all age categories owes more to the promotion of the ideology of age
neutrality by means of ageism discourses than to individuals’ experiences. In
this connection, it might be noted that the dissociation of ageism from old
age did not arise from lobbying by younger people against ageism, but
rather from a priori reasoning or the ‘ logical ’ extension of the original
concept by academics and equality advocates. Nevertheless, the evidence
that it is not just older people who perceive diﬀerential age treatment as
discriminatory cannot simply be dismissed; it counters the assumption of
age-status systems as internalised, functional and having broad support.
One explanation is that age systems and norms are ﬂuid and change over
time along with such factors as improved health, the changing age struc-
ture, and changes in the ages and forms of emotional, sexual and intel-
lectual maturity among younger people. Social and legal conventions that
become outdated may be experienced as discriminatory (Neugarten 1981:
816–8). The limitations of using chronological age as a proxy for deter-
mining social or functional age transitions is another likely cause. These
forms of perceived age discrimination are, however, diﬀerent from the
more pernicious and elaborate forms of age prejudice that aﬀect old
people. Indeed, Oswick and Rosenthal (2001) found much evidence
of outdated age norms in employment, as embraced in the customary
‘age-typing’ of diﬀerent occupations, but found no evidence that these
norms denoted a more generalised prejudice on the part of employers
against any particular age group.
Policy implications
If it is accepted that old-age prejudice should be confronted as a distinctive
and pressing problem, then remedies are required that do not embrace
damaging notions of age equivalence. This section considers the scope for
such responses.
The scope for legal remedy
The UK Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 and the European Union
Directive from which they derive are deﬁcient in three main respects as a
means for challenging old-age prejudice. Most obvious is their restriction
1146 Colin Duncan
to employment. If age prejudice intensiﬁes with age in broader structural
and institutional manifestations, then the exclusion of goods, facilities and
services from the scope of the law is clearly perverse. The second defect is
the endorsement of ‘ formal equality ’, or consistency of treatment, as a
dominant equality principle to promote the notion of age equivalence.
As Fredman (2003) observed, this principle cannot promote appropriate
treatment according to age diﬀerence. For instance, the refusal to allow
ﬂexible working may prove more harmful to older than younger workers,
but to assert equality does not itself create a right to ﬂexible working. Nor
does this criterion assist in distinguishing invidious prejudice from appro-
priate age diﬀerentiation, and its application to achieve age parity may
result in older workers losing beneﬁts if they are levelled down not up.
A third limitation is that there are no requirements under EU or UK law
to accommodate older workers whose labour-market characteristics or
personal capability are judged inconsistent with business exigencies,
though displacing such labour is now subject to fairly stringent ‘objective
justiﬁcation’ criteria.
United Kingdom equality law is currently in ferment, however, with
plans for a single Equality Act, and the establishment in 2007 of the new
Commission on Equality and Human Rights (CEHR), which replaced
existing commissions and is to oversee implementation of the Human Rights
Act 1998. Motivating this process have been long-running concerns over
the complexity and inconsistency of current discrimination laws, fears
of competition for victim status from an overcrowded equality agenda,
and the envisaged problems of dealing with individuals who have en-
countered ‘multiple discriminations’. This has prompted the search for
a ‘grounding’ principle that can rationalise and bind together diﬀerent
forms of discrimination, and incorporate human rights legislation. Most
discussed in this context has been the notion of ‘equal human dignity ’
(Disability Rights Commission 2006; Fredman 2003; Hepple 2003), a
principle long recognised in human rights adjudication. Rooted in
the Kantian notion of inherent human worth, the concept of dignity has
already made inroads into equality laws, including in the EU Race and
Employment Directives to deﬁne harassment, and has been especially as-
sociated with court proceedings in Canadian and South African courts,
countries often cited as models for a dignity-based equality jurisprudence.
Should discrimination law progress in this direction, older people
might secure better protection. Equal respect for the dignity of people
of diﬀerent ages will on occasion require treating diﬀerent age groups
diﬀerently. Indeed, the age lobby has long campaigned for a richer con-
cept of age neutrality on this basis, one that eschews damaging notions
of agelessness in favour of equal dignity in protecting age-related special
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needs (Age Concern England 1999: 24–33). Moreover, as equality based
on dignity must enhance rather than debase individuals, it is diﬃcult to
argue that a levelling down solution is as good as one that levels up,
thereby protecting age-based interventions that favour older people. It is
possible too that the dignity criterion could help elevate age protection
relative to commercial rationality in determining the treatment of older
workers.
For Fredman (2003), the beneﬁts of this approach crucially rely not only
upon extending the law to goods, facilities and services, but also upon a
more pro-active approach than is possible under a complaints-based liti-
gation model, including the use of mainstreaming and enforcement of
public obligations through compliance orders. This argument is supported
by the limited impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 with respect to the
institutional and health-care treatment of dependent older people. The
Act enshrined dignity criteria and human rights, and created obligations
for organisations that carry out public functions, but to date the responses
have been described as minimalist and reactive, focused only upon
avoiding litigation; moreover, vulnerable older people have lacked the
means, conﬁdence, skills and stamina necessary to pursue complaints
(Butler 2006; Harding 2005). Nevertheless, the CEHR will not have the
power to enforce public duties or to issue compliance notices in the case of
age (DTI 2004: 72).
Townsend (2006) argued that the human rights route provides the
greatest legal and institutional scope for tackling discrimination against
older people, including that of ‘ institutionalised ageism’ derived from
structured dependency, and that the ‘universalism’ of human rights can
better address multiple manifestations of discrimination and deprivation
than current targeted approaches. He shares the view that the indivisibility
of human rights provides a valuable grounding principle with which to
integrate and simplify anti-discrimination frameworks. Although the in-
ﬂuence of human rights upon equality agenda has evolved very rapidly
and is having a substantial impact upon the law, progress is being seriously
hampered by the inadequate methodology of human rights implemen-
tation, which is in its infancy. New and imaginative research methodo-
logies are therefore required to deﬁne and measure aﬀronts to human
dignity and identity that currently go unrecorded. Only by measuring and
operationalising such concepts can reliable evidence be produced of viol-
ations and the institutions and policies required in response.
As well as the limited impact of theHuman Rights Act, the evidence that is
emerging from judicial processes is consistent with Townsend’s analysis.
One recent review of case law in Canada and South Africa has shown that
perceptions of dignity are undeﬁned, amorphous and subjective and that
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this has provided broad scope for value judgements and perverse decisions
that frustrate equality principles (O’Connell 2006).
Tackling ‘ontological ageism ’
It might be inferred from Cole’s (1992) analysis that legislative measures
can deal at best with the symptoms rather than the essence of old-age
prejudice. Indeed for Cole, the solution lies in ‘ social criticism and public
dialogue aimed at creating socially just, economically sound, and spiri-
tually satisfying meanings of aging’ (1992:239). Few practical suggestions
as to appropriate policies have been forthcoming, however, at least in the
secular sphere. Cole’s work has nevertheless generated valuable debate on
the relationship between meaning and wellbeing in older age, with
Generations, the journal of the American Society of Aging, devoting a special issue
to this theme in 1999. Ageing identity and ‘genuine ageing’ have now
become prominent themes in the ﬁeld of social gerontology (particularly in
the work of Biggs 1993, 2005), and have important implications for how
professional carers and practitioners should interact with older people. In
terms of broader social policy, however, the implications remain unclear,
apart from Cole’s preference for policies that emphasise communitarian
values and intergenerational solidarity and that might help reconnect
older people to society. Hence, in adjudicating upon United States welfare
reforms, a social insurance model is favoured over the promotion of in-
dividual retirement accounts, because the latter promote individuality and
disconnect people from ‘a higher spiritual or ethical purpose’ (Cole and
Stevenson 1999: 76). The reasoning and terminology are unlikely to con-
vince hard-nosed policy-makers.
Age activism and the third-age movement
As a guide to policy, Cole’s historical analysis has been seen as somewhat
irrelevant in view of the massive improvements in average life expectation
over the last century and the tripling of older people’s share of the all-age
population. These demographic conditions have no historical or cultural
precedent that might inform policy. The ‘ontological ageism’ and preju-
dice that face today’s ‘old ’ therefore require new, more urgent and pro-
active remedies than can be achieved through a metaphysic on the
meaning of life (Laslett 1999). For Laslett (1996), the emergence of a new
‘third age’, located between the ‘second age’ of family responsibility and
work life, and the ‘ fourth age’ of ﬁnal dependency and decline, could be a
period of personal fulﬁlment and the ‘crown of life ’ for older people.
While the health, national wealth, longevity and demographic conditions
required for the emergence of the third age had been met in Britain by
The limitations of age-equality agenda 1149
around 1950, conceptions of older people were still dominated by the
negative stereotypes of dependence and inactivity, which rendered third
agers as ‘a generation in limbo’, subject to prejudice and forced into
‘ indolence’. A somewhat idealistic manifesto for third agers was therefore
proposed, which aimed to confront old-age prejudice by re-engaging them
with society through new social roles, especially in the educational sphere
and as custodians of the cultural inheritance. An institutional catalyst was
to be the ‘Universities of the Third Age’ (U3A), ﬁnanced and run by and
for third agers and organised through a federal structure of local branches.
Their goal was to foster activity through education, and to raise third-age
consciousness, conﬁdence and autonomy.
Laslett’s ideas were initially of considerable inﬂuence, and led in the
UK to the institution of a remarkable three-year research project by
The Carnegie Trust into third age matters during 1989–92, followed by
a three-year Carnegie Third Age Programme to promote third age issues to
policy-makers. This coincided with the emergence of the anti-ageism
bandwagon in the early 1990s, however, and Laslett’s vision of active
ageing was quickly over-shadowed by, and even enlisted in support
of, anti-ageism perspectives inimical to his vision. Damaging notions of
agelessness geared chieﬂy to promoting employment opportunities for
older people, and culminating in the current ideologies of work obligation
and pension retrenchment, torpedoed signiﬁcant progress in this direction.
This was despite a vigorous defence by Laslett of the aﬀordability of the
third age, and his and his followers’ insistence (e.g. Gibson 2000) that rec-
ognition of the third age did not condone agelessness nor anti-ageing
sentiments. He also insisted that the second age could not easily be pro-
longed by political decree because, in common with Macnicol (2006), he
doubted that the demand for labour would ever be suﬃcient for older
workers to remain in employment. Other controversies generated by
Laslett’s work included: whether the lived experience of personal ageing,
which for many entails gradual transformations and a progressive dimin-
ution in the quality of life, is realistically represented by discrete lifecourse
stages (Siegel 1990) ; whether elevating the third age relative to the fourth
as a partial solution to the denigration of all older people might intensify
rather than reduce prejudice against even more marginalised fourth agers
(Young and Schuller 1991: 181) ; and scepticism about the ‘grandiose ex-
pectations ’ implied by the new social roles envisaged for third agers
(Laslett 1996: xii).
In retrospect, it is not surprising that an apolitical campaign of this kind,
resting upon a curious mix of advocacy, reason and idealism, should fail
to make much progress even though third age activism remains very
much alive – in 2006, the United Kingdom national U3A website boasted
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a membership of 350,000. Moreover, proposals continue to be made for
a more autonomous and inﬂuential role for older people. For instance,
Ben-Israel and Ben-Israel (2002) drew parallels between the emergence of
the third age and that of the industrial proletariat during the 19th century,
and argued that both third and fourth agers have yet to achieve ‘social
dignity ’ comparable to that achieved by organised labour, as manifested
in labour law and collective bargaining rights. They proposed a new legal
discipline or ‘‘ senior citizens’ law’’ that would regulate their status and
provide protected rights, including freedom of organisation and social
collective bargaining. Agency-shop arrangements could overcome the
diﬃculty of organising a scattered, ageing constituency, with an organis-
ation tax deducted from old-age pensions and paid to the most represen-
tative organisation. Such organisations could then reach legally binding
social-collective bargaining agreements, with legally protected sanctions in
the form of consumer boycotts, pickets and protests.
Such proposals are not wholly fanciful, given the increased political
clout of an ageing electorate, and some evidence that ‘generational con-
sciousness ’ characterises current third agers (Gilleard and Higgs 2002).
Indeed, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) with its member-
ship in excess of 35 million is often cited as the most powerful lobby group
in Washington. In Britain, representational membership-based groups
for older people are small and few, but this may change. In 2006, a new
membership organisation, Heyday, was launched with support from Age
Concern England for people planning for or in retirement. It was explicitly
modelled on the AARP and Dane Age in Denmark, and targets the
‘younger old’ or third agers, although Age Concern plans to reorient its
activities towards fourth-age issues.
Policy towards older workers
In contrast to the current model of workfare solutions, an alternative
approach to confronting the harsh labour-market conditions that face
many older workers would be a radical package of imaginative measures
to subsidise work at older ages. For Macnicol (2006: 114–5), these could
include additional in-work beneﬁts, older worker employment quotas, the
extension of pensions to all those aged 50 or more years with no retirement
condition, and changes in work conditions to reduce stress. Though this
would be expensive and wholly against the grain of current policies and
ideologies, it is argued that in the long run there would be net savings from
a reduced requirement for social security support. Policy in this direction
would also oﬀer a genuine choice between working and retirement.
Moreover, as beneﬁts would be extended to younger age groups rather
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than being removed from older people, the material basis for a positive
third age is preserved.
Conclusions
Anti-ageism has something of the character of a principle in search of a
cause. Though emerging from concerns over the treatment of older people,
who continue to experience age prejudice in its most virulent forms, its
recent incorporation into several voluntary and statutory equality agenda
has reoriented concerns towards simplistic and unrealistic notions of age
equalisation and equivalence, goals that originate neither from social
movements nor from the demands of oppressed minorities. This rootless-
ness has also rendered age-equality agendas prone to ideological ma-
nipulation, by which they are invoked to undermine the interests of older
people, both within and outside employment. Arguably, then, current
anti-ageism agenda are in crisis.
The distinct origins and many manifestations of old-age prejudice tran-
scend simple equality constructs. Equality agenda that treat older people
as ‘prime age’ adults or ageless beings deny and downgrade their dis-
tinctive needs and actual and potential contributions, and question the
legitimacy of old age per se, and they especially denigrate those who cannot
conform. Moreover, the fear, negativity and absence of meaning with
which old age is often regarded, gives rise to a brand of age prejudice that
is scarcely equivalent to that which aﬀects younger adults. A shift in
equality agendas towards human rights constructs such as ‘dignity ’ may
work in favour of older people by endorsing diﬀerential treatment on the
basis of diﬀerential age-related needs ; as by challenging utilitarian criteria
in the allocation of scarce medical and other resources ; and by confront-
ing the demeaning attitudes and treatment that follow from the perception
of older people as in certain respects less than human. Movement in this
direction is by no means certain, however, and to be of signiﬁcant value,
will require the extension of age-discrimination law beyond employment,
and more pro-active means of compliance and enforcement than now
seem likely.
It might be argued, moreover, that legislation of any kind can do little
more than tackle some of the symptoms of old-age prejudice, because its
causes lie ultimately in denial of mortality or the human condition. The
resulting ontological barrenness of older age and associated prejudice
may, however, be lessened by policy approaches that seek to re-connect
older people to mainstream society, and to this end, welfare and pension
approaches that emphasise communitarian values and intergenerational
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solidarity have been advocated. The notion of intergenerational solidarity
has secured further support as a counter-ideology to protect older people’s
welfare rights against intergenerational inequity and age-wars perspectives,
and is widely endorsed by the international age-awareness and human
rights lobbies. Hence, Age Concern England established a UK-wide ‘ inter-
generational network’ in 1999 and runs several programmes to promote
solidarity. The issue has been taken up at European level, with a European
Commission Green Paper that promotes solidarity (Commission of the
European Communities 2005), while the United Nations’ ‘ International
Youth Day’ in 2004 had has its chief theme ‘youth in an intergenerational
society ’.
On the other hand, this emphasis could undermine more autonomous
and pro-active challenges to old-age prejudice on the part of older people
themselves, who now constitute a large, mostly active and potentially
powerful political constituency. Indeed, for Laslett (1996: 253), notions of
intergenerational solidarity have little historical legitimacy, and denote a
patronising and controlling attitude towards older people. Instead, older
people should seek a degree of ﬁnancial and social autonomy. In terms
of pension reforms, and in sharp contrast to Cole and Stevenson (1999),
he therefore advocated a personal retirement-fund model that entailed
an element of compulsory saving along the lines proposed by Falkingham
and Johnson (1995). This combines earnings-related funded pensions with
tax-ﬁnanced minimum pension provision in a single system, one that
would allow people visibly and adequately to pay for their own third age.
It would help identify and address generational inequity and would ensure
a greater degree of intra-generational justice (Laslett 1996: 247–49).
Moreover, Falkingham and Johnson (1995: 215) estimated that the scheme
would result in net savings to the Treasury.
A second schism in thinking about how to tackle old-age prejudice is
of course the dichotomy between promoting employment and the vision
of a new third age characterised by personal fulﬁlment and new social
roles. The latter construction of active ageing has been all but subverted
by the anti-ageism bandwagon and the associated work obligation ideo-
logies ; these continue to threaten the material basis for a productive third
age, and indeed there has been little political or academic discussion of
the concept since the Carnegie Trust initiatives over a decade ago.
Revisiting the third age concept therefore seems merited, including dis-
cussion and resolution of some of the major controversies initiated by
Laslett but which were never resolved. Clearly, the harsh labour-market
conditions facing older workers also merit attention. Yet if, as argued
by Macnicol (2006: 96–101) and others, the historical evidence is that
‘ the lump of labour fallacy’ – the notion that the number of jobs in an
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economy is ﬁxed or constant – is not fallacious with respect to older
workers, then Laslett’s vision (or a modiﬁcation of it) seems eminently
preferable to what otherwise may be in store for many older people forced
by economic necessity to re-enter employment at the bottom end of the
labour market. Radical measures to subsidise employment at older ages is
a further option that could provide genuine choice between work and
retirement while preserving the material conditions for a productive
third age.
Activism by or on behalf of older people is likely to intensify in the face
of the current threats, and will no doubt be boosted by the growing in-
ﬂuence of an ageing electorate. This could prove to be a conservative and
reactive force, geared chieﬂy to defending pension and welfare arrange-
ments designed for a previous era, and weakened by recourse to equality
constructs that inadequately reﬂect and confront the roots of prejudice.
Alternatively, such activism could contribute to a climate for change to-
wards newer, more positive visions and experiences of older age both
within and outside the employment sphere. For this more comprehensive
and constructive path to be taken, new thinking and changes of emphasis
will be required by advocacy groups, policy-makers and the academic
community. The key requirements include a policy shift on the part of the
‘age lobby’ from defensive strategies and ideologies of generational in-
terdependence and solidarity towards promoting organisational, ﬁnancial
and social autonomy in older age. Pension reform might also be usefully
informed by the same criteria. Greater recognition is also required by
equality advocates that older age is poorly served by current anti-
discrimination templates, not only with respect to the weaknesses inherent
in their endorsement of age equivalence, but also given the time-static
adjudication framework. Extension of age laws beyond employment is a
minimum requirement, and the legitimacy of policies and statutes directed
speciﬁcally to old-age prejudice needs consideration. With respect to re-
search agendas, a focus upon the methodology of human rights is clearly
required. Another priority is to resume conceptual and empirical work on
new ‘third age’ social roles, a line of inquiry that continues to be under-
mined by the current over-emphasis upon labour market issues as the ﬁrst
step in tackling old-age prejudice.
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